Sunday, January 23, 2011

Out on a Limb

Looking out the window of my stairway landing onto the backyard, I notice a dust of snow dislodged from the tall elm’s branch. A squirrel is inching its cautious way to the twig-like end of a branch of a limb, arriving finally at the gap of space separating it from the equally twig-like end of a branch of a limb across from it. The squirrel eyes that gap, regards it. Its tail undulates. The limb’s end bends under its 2 pound weight. No doubt its four-chambered heart has accelerated considerably beyond its normal 280 beats per minute. And then it leaps, hurls itself into space, across the emptiness, to land sure-pawedly, pausing momentarily as its new perch sags and recovers before scurrying on.

That safe landing is no slam dunk. Squirrels do sometimes slip, stumble at their mark, and plummet to the ground; and while their tail can function as a parachute to cushion a short fall, a fall from the height of that elm’s branch could break bones and spine. The Rodentia condition, like the human one, is filled with quotidian microdramas. Seeing that squirrel poised on a verge, meagerly supported, I’d like to think its racing little heart took on a percussive beat, a rapid and rhythmic contraction that fueled its courage to venture out on a limb.

I have been told at various times by various people to avoid going out on a limb. “Out on a limb” is an idiomatic phrase; its meaning is connotative and figurative rather than literal. Like all idiomatic phrases, it is not used innocently. It suggests a way of thinking and feeling; it gestures toward a normative boundary. Being “out on a limb” means being at risk, vulnerable, and it is almost always functions as a social warning or proscription, as a location to avoid placing oneself at, for social support there is dangerously weak, may snap, and one may fall to the lonely, unforgiving, injurious ground. Better to stay near the trunk, the solid trunk, where the branches thicken and are more compactly congregated and better able to bear one’s weight, where even the stoutest breeze barely registers on their unswayable density.

I was never cautioned against going out on an intellectual or athletic limb. “Truth is conformity of the mind with reality,” the Christian Brothers at my high school told me, quoting Aquinas; so, “sapere aude,” dare to know. They gave me Latin, and I had the key to English grammar and all the Romance languages. They gave me Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, and I had the yin and yang of Christianity. They gave me Freud and Jung, and I understood myself and others better. Subsequent teachers at higher levels gave me theology and philosophy and history and literature, told me to think long and hard and critically, with and against the grain of what I read, to add my voice to the great conversation—a wealth of knowledge that I could spend lavishly, like a plutocrat, without fear of bankruptcy. On the athletic field I was told to be a winner, not at all costs, but at the cost of all my effort and energy; to play through pain, to practice and train, to play smart and intuitively. In school and sports I was encouraged and exhorted and pushed to tread out on a limb, to accumulate and expend intellectual and physical capital, to enter the ranks of the elite.

But such was not the counsel I received regarding the social sphere. I was admonished to conserve social capital, to maintain connections, to not be a stranger in the social landscape, to not separate myself from social networks—indeed, the denser the network, the better one’s expectation of reciprocity and trust. A strange paradox seems to be at work here. In the classroom and on the playing fields, the display of individual excellence was expected. In the public square, however, in the everyday moving among and interacting with others, such behavior was experienced as arrogant or narcissistic or an idiosyncratic weirdness or difference, fit only for the margin, for the periphery where social displeasure lies, for a distant suburb to the metropolitan center of social acceptability. On the one hand, we are urged to develop a personal style, an original voice, an individualized legibility, a unique, signatory perspective to inscribe on things and events. On the other hand, we are urged to avoid those very qualities for fear of ostracism or ridicule, for fear of “the eyes that fix you in a formulated phrase.” We are urged to practice little more than a faceless gaze.

I think that, in the social sphere, this unwillingness to exhibit difference can be dangerous, inviting what media theorist Elisabeth Noelle-Neuman calls “the spiral of silence.” According to Noelle-Neuman, the social voices that are the loudest and most constantly amplified through various media garner the most attention, even if they express perspectives unshared by the majority of listeners. But hearing those perspectives expressed so often in so many venues convinces the majority that it is, in fact, a minority, a conviction that tends to render it less and less likely to speak out, less and less likely to go out on the limb of public discourse. The majority, in effect, gradually spirals into silence, and minority perspectives become dominant. The marketplace of public discourse becomes a monopoly; the dynamic churn of competing ideas is thwarted, and the truth-seeking goal of argument is stifled.

I believe that out on a limb is where we sometimes need to be. We need the risk, the sway, the feel of our own weight so we do not find ourselves conscripted and uniformed and crisply saluting ways of thinking and acting adopted at the bidding of others. We need to declare the separation point between our selves and the social self, if we feel a point of separation. We need to listen, and then we need to reflect, to hold an inner conversation between our convictions and the convictions of others. It is “irresistibly tempting,” David Foster Wallace observes, “to fall in with some established dogmatic camp.” If it calls, when it calls, we need the courage, and the intellectual integrity, not to heed the lure of the limb’s end.

Saturday, January 15, 2011

Why Benjamin Franklin Is Cool

The founding fathers were mostly cool. George Washington possessed discipline, discernment, and integrity, but seems aloof and was a bit too fond of fitted uniforms that displayed his muscular physique. Thomas Jefferson had a brilliant mind, wrote the Declaration of Independence, advocated a “wall” between religion and the state, and sent Lewis and Clark on their exploratory way, remained a slaveowner despite an emancipator sensibility. James Madison wrote the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, defended religious freedom, successfully prosecuted the War of 1812, and married the sprightly, party-loving Dolly, but he too owned slaves. John Adams ferociously advocated independence, but presided as president over the oppressive Alien and Sedition Acts, which nullified free speech. Patrick Henry gave an inspiring “give me liberty or give me death” speech, but advocated state taxes to support Christian religion and opposed the Constitution because it abrogated states’ rights.

But for me, the founding father who is totally, florescently cool, is Benjamin Franklin. Why? Not because his unremitting industry enabled him to retire wealthy enough at 42 to pursue public projects; not because he invented bifocals, established a library, and discovered electricity; and not because he is on the hundred dollar bill. Benjamin Franklin is cool because he possessed a rare gift: the ability to laugh at himself.

Here’s one small example in an autobiography filled with such examples. At 16, Franklin adopted vegetarianism. Not long after, however, he was tempted by Cod. While on a voyage from Boston to New York, he is stranded due to lack of wind on a small island. Some of the others in his group begin fishing, catch some cod, and cook them over an open flame. Now Franklin considered eating fish “a kind of unprovok’d Murder, since none of them had or ever could do us any injury that might justify the Slaughter.” However, he had always been “a great Lover of Fish,” and when the delicious smell of cod “came hot out of the Frying Pan,” he “balanc’d some time between Principle and Inclination,” until remembering “that when the Fish were opened,” he “saw smaller Fish taken out of their stomachs.” So, Franklin reasons, if the fish eat one another, he sees no reason why he “mayn’t eat” them. “So convenient a thing it is to be a reasonable Creature,” Franklin concludes, “since it enables one to find or make a Reason for everything one has a mind to do.”

And right there, in that slippery watermelon seed of a rationalization and the deadpan conclusion he draws from it, we see Franklin’s coolness. Franklin is a man of the Enlightenment, an age that viewed reason as the means of human perfectability, yet he knows that reason can justify inclination over principle, appetite over precept. He knows that self-indulgence often suborns the best of intentions, that we are often bridled by our desires and led away from our moral resolutions, that the embodied senses can be smithy furnaces that render our ethics pliant. Long before Bohr and Heisenberg appeared on the scene, Franklin saw an uncertainty principle at work, in human nature itself. We are complex, sometimes self-deceiving, unfitted for moral absolutism. We are, as Alexander Pope says, “darkly wise, and rudely great”—The glory, jest, and riddle of the world.” Yet, Franklin can live with such irreconcilable aspects of human being, unshivved by the kind of guilt Augustine felt at stealing some pears from a neighbor’s tree, perfectly OK with the fact that we sometimes shadowbox with reason and experience a small fall from grace. And Franklin gives us this picture of human contradiction in a “the joke’s on me” spirit. It is a mini-sermon delivered not in the thunderous, apocalyptic tone of a jeremiad, but in an avuncular, good-natured tone of self-mockery. That’s cool.

But self-mockery, I think, is actually more than cool. It is necessary. People who can mock themselves understand that all assumptions about the world and our place and action in it are contingent and mutable. They will not be immobilized in rigid systems of belief, systems that induce anxiety when threatened, violence when violated. They will not resist the challenge to look honestly at themselves, will not resist the sallies of doubt about why they do what they do, think what they think, believe what they believe. They know that reason is flawed, that it rationalizes, that it succumbs to confirmation bias, and that it elevates and ennobles us only in proportion to the constancy of our willingness to place it under critique. This is what Franklin teaches. It is cool. It is important. Our capacity to live together and deliberate together, to find reciprocal trust in each other, to understand that human pursuits and perspectives are never reducible to one idea of what is absolutely, irrevocably, comprehensively good or true, depends on it.

Monday, January 10, 2011

Language, Thought, and Politics

Many of the attempts to explain what motivated Jared Lee Loughner’s attempted assassination of Arizona Rep. Gabrielle Giffords have centered on language, specifically on the pernicious effect of the intemperately hostile rhetoric that has recently characterized the political scene. Implicit in these explanations is an old debate in the field of linguistics: to what extent, if any, language influences thought.

Loughner himself has claimed that the government engages in “mind control” and brainwashing “by controlling grammar.” The belief that language determines the way we think, known as linguistic determinism, was advanced some 70 years ago by Benjamin Lee Whorf. The world’s “flux of impressions,” Whorf maintained, is “organized by our minds—and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.” Phenomena, in effect, are “codified in the patterns” of language.

Whorf’s strong causal ligaturing of language and thought has few adherents now, but a weaker version of it is generally accepted. According to Guy Deutscher, language influences our minds “not because of what it allows us to think but rather because of what it habitually obliges us to think about.” These habits of speech, Deutscher says, “can settle into habits of mind” and affect our “experiences, perceptions, associations, feelings, memories and orientation in the world.” They force us “to be attentive to certain details in the world and to certain aspects of experience.” A language in which nouns are assigned gender, for example, can influence the kinds of adjectives used to describe them. In “Metaphors We Live By,” George Lakoff and Mark Johnson assert that metaphors structure the way we perceive and understand the world, and the way we relate to others. It makes an attitudinal difference if a politician is described as a “clueless” or a “gangster,” if an audience is exhorted to “take our country back” or be “armed and dangerous,” or if the crosshairs mapped on congressional districts are described as a “gun sites” or “surveyors’ symbols.”

We may use language mindlessly, but it is seldom received that way. As Ludwig Wittgenstein’s concept of “language games” suggests, language is meaningful because its use is catalyzed by a variety of rule-governed social practices, practices that are largely unspoken aspects of our social reality. Over the last two years, political language has too often operated according to rules that permit excessively heated and immoderate militancy. It is time to remember that words are deeds, not simply the intangible exhalations of breath that generate them. It is time to think, to think hard, about the words we use to describe others. It is time to remember that in the political language game, abrasive discourse, denunciatory discourse, discourse barbed with skepticism and sarcasm, is well within the rules. Discourse that advocates armed rampancy and violence, overtly or covertly, is not.

Saturday, January 8, 2011

Do We Reason? Do We Have Free Will? Does It Matter?

I’ve been reading lately a good bit of the social psychology and neuroscience literature devoted to human decision-making, especially as it applies to making moral judgments. It has been a humbling experience but not, I think, a necessarily disheartening one.

By and large, these studies in the science of morality conclude that we are not the rational creatures we think ourselves to be. We are not thoughtful in making moral judgments; our thought processes are not especially subtle or penetrating; our consciousness is not especially discerning or sophisticated. We do not carefully analyze a situation and, on the basis of that analysis, decide whether or not an action is wrong or right. Rather, it seems, our judgments occur beneath or behind or outside of conscious awareness, and are galvanized by emotions, intuitions, and physical sensations. Reason simply justifies decisions always already made by processes external to it. Perhaps Emerson is right: our “primary wisdom” is “Spontaneity or Instinct,”—an “Intuition, whilst all later teaching are tuitions.” And perhaps David Hume was right: reason is “the slave of passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.”

Here is a quick summary of some representative studies:
• What we consider moral or immoral behavior is influenced by the cleanliness or dirtiness of the environment in which the decision is made. Simone Schnall, a social psychologist at the University of Cambridge, reports that people sitting at a dirty table in a room pervaded by a foul odor consider doctoring a resume to improve their employment prospects wrong; at a clean table in a pleasant-smelling room, they consider it acceptable. Evidently, the emotions aroused by the ambient surroundings transfer to moral judgments.
• Sitting in a comfortable or uncomfortable chair, holding a hold or cold beverage, or filling out a questionnaire with or without a clipboard influence assessments of other people. Holding a hot beverage, sitting in a comfortable chair, and filling out a questionnaire without a clipboard result in friendlier assessments of others.
• Seeing others perform a good deed for someone inspires the observers to feel morally elevated, and motivates them to lend assistance to others themselves, often going out of their way to do so. Thus, the secret of Oprah’s success. As Blaise Pacal noted, “The heart has reasons that reason knows not of.”
• Behavior can be “primed” by language. Given a task description containing some words referring to old age, test subjects performed the task more slowly than a control group whose task description did not include those words. Words that refer to higher education led to improved scores in games of Trivial Pursuits.
• On sunny days, people tend to be more satisfied with their lives than on rainy days.
• People who are politically conservative have a larger amygdale—an area in the center of the brain associated with anxiety—and a smaller anterior angulate—a front-brain area associated with optimism and fortitude. Though it is unknown whether these areas are shaped by experience or are inherent in brain structure, the finding suggests political outlooks are not reasoned choices. A “liberal gene”—DRD4—has been identified; its possessor tends to respond positively to unconventional perspectives.
• People seek a “moral equilibrium,” a self-satisfaction that they wish to maintain. Those who experience moral equilibrium are less likely, due to a “moral licensing effect” to help others, feeling that they are already good persons. Those who feel a moral disequilibrium are more likely to help others, thereby restoring a sense of moral balance.
• In his book “The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values,” neuroscientist Sam Harris asserts that free will is an illusion. He cites experiments in which the brains of subjects in an MRI machine display activity up to io seconds before consciously deciding to do something. Such findings, Harris says, “are difficult to reconcile with the sense that one is the conscious source of one’s actions.”

It is difficult not to read this research as yet the latest instance of a 400 year history of human displacement from pride of place. First, Copernicus and Galileo removed earth, and its human inhabitants, from the center of the universe; then, Darwin stiffarmed the belief that we were created imago dei, in the image of God, by theorizing that we were produced from earlier forms of life; then, Freud informed us that we were quite unaware of the motivations for our actions, sequestered as they were in unlit cavern of the flamboyantly irrational id; then, linguists began a mugging of the distinguishing features of human language, finding the so-called “language gene,” Fox 2P, in birds and discovering grammatical complexity in the calls of certain nonhuman creatures; now, the “science of morality” suggests that moral decisions are either automatic mental subroutines or impulse-imbued intensities of feeling that masquerade as deliberative judgment. “It don’t seem natural,” as Huck Finn would say, but the research reckons “it’s so,” and it is tempting to see these findings as assaults on free will and human dignity, as grist for the mill of a despondent determinism or moral irresponsibility.

I think that would be a mistake.

I do not see the revelations of morality science as especially pernicious. If they indeed uncurtain fundamental conditions, then let’s accept them as such. If we know they are true, if we understand that we process our experience of the world through affect and hidden emotion, then we are in a fair way of exerting a governing control over it. Even if our actions spring largely from involuntary factors, taking responsibility for them decreases the lure of infatuated impulsivity. We may not have free will, but we can at least exert that neuroscientist Benjamin Libet calls “free won’t.” We can, like Odysseus, lash ourselves to the mast of restraint.

That reason is not the pure source of our action in the world changes nothing about what we are or what we do. We have always sought to be self-intelligible so we could assume responsibility for ourselves and the world we inhabit. We have always felt moral tugs and urgings. Where our sense of moral value comes from is less important than the fact that we have such a sense. Its origin in no way diminishes its significance, or the value we attach to our goals and intentions. We will still perform charitable acts, still feel compassion, still exhibit loyalty, still meet obligations, still practice self-denial, still entune ourselves with the melody of all the outward-reaching virtues that mark our humanity. We always have. We will still make things, things with design and function, things that incarnate our purposeful striving. We always have. We will still be remarkably, endlessly creative. We always have. Despite being an irreducibly messy bundle of qualities, we will still be adventurous, still feel a transcendent spirit, still be taken by wildly extravagant flashes of imagination. We always have. We have always been taken by courage and love and virtue and faith and wonder and beauty and justice, and we have always written the narrative of that captivity. We always have been, and will continue to be, subjects encountering other subjects, one moving among many, experiencing risk and conflict, and held accountable for what we are and what we do

I am not naive. I have not been Pollyannaed and Panglossed into believing that we live in the best of all possible worlds. I know that the history of human beings on this planet displays lavish cruelty, cruelty that too often bears compound interest. I know that people blink when staring down moral challenges, that hearts and minds have been adamantine, that in taking a long, backward glance, “one sees more devils than vast hell can hold.” Still, I do believe we need not fall into a kind of secular Calvinism, skeptical of the value or efficacy of human actions, simply because we may do things for no good reason. We still do good, in small ways and large. We too easily forget that. It is worth remembering that in the last 150 years we have abolished slavery, that labor unionized to guarantee workers’ rights, that consumers upended “buyer beware” in favor of “seller beware,” that we established civil and voting rights, addressed concerns about gender equality, proscribed environmental degradation, outlawed gay bashing, and asserted non-human animal rights.

Problems, highly vexing, perhaps indurate, problems, assuredly remain. But I choose to take heart from this: while Galileo’s book Sideries Nuncius, Starry Messenger, may have demoted humanity from its exalted perch in the order of things, it ironically promoted humanity as well, for it unveiled truths hidden behind dogma and superstition and unquestioned tradition and enshrined opinion, truths that set knowledge afoot in the world, truths that, finally, in the balance of things, made us, and our world, not the best we and it can be, but better.

Saturday, January 1, 2011

The Art of the Insult

It’s a new year, and, at some point during it, inevitably, you’ll want to insult someone. Hurling an insult feels so good; it’s such an explosion of catharsis, such a rapturous rupture of annoyingly ossified social discourse, such a tuft of crabgrass in the Zen garden of civility, such a tasering stimulation of the brain’s reward pathways—and, besides, the recipients just deserve it. This year, though, let’s resolve to elevate our insults, give them some class and sophistication, for classy, sophisticated insults double the cortical arousal: they leave the insultee nonplussedly silent as well as listeringly binsulted. So, to that end, I offer the following selection of insults from that capo di capi of insultitude, William Shakespeare.
• Is his head worth a hat?
• A knot you are of damned bloodsuckers
• A fusty nut with no kernel
• A man who is the abstract of all faults that all men follow
• I desire that we be better strangers
• A pox o’ your throat, you bawling, blasphemous, incharitable dog
• Go thou and fill another room in hell
• Thine face is not worth sunburning
• Priests must become mockers, if they shall encounter such ridiculous subjects as you
• God grant we never have need of you
• Thy mother’s name is ominous to all children
• He has not so much brain as ear-wax
• He speaks nothing but madman
• Foul indigested lump
• Let vultures gripe they guts
• If you spend word for word with me, I shall make your wit bankrupt
• Leave they vain bibble-babble
• Idol of idiot-worshippers
• I’ll carbonade your shanks
• I throw thy name against the bruising rocks
• Thou full dish of fool
• I think thou art an ass
• Were I like thee, I would throw away myself.
• Owner of no one good quality
• You scullion! You rampallian! You fustilarian! I’ll tickle your catastrophe!
• Methink’st thou art a general offense and every man should beat thee
• That bolting-hutch of beastliness, that swollen parcel of dropsies
• There’s no more faith in thee than in a stewed prune
• Thou art unfit for any place but hell
• Thou are pigeon-livered and lack gall
• A most pathetical nit
• You are as a candle, the better burnt out

It’s fun to make up your own using Shakespeare as a model. Here’s a few I’ve created and intend to use this year, in meetings most likely:
• That vial of bubonic mediocrity
• Cease thou thy wince-inducing quantum of ego-addled prattle
• Thy wit is as a chassis onto which nonsense is welded
• Take hence thy puckering astringent ineptitude
• Conscience-deprived credit default swapper
• Oh arrant blunderer, thou speak’st solecistic ignorance
• I find thy thinking of like clarity with the stochastic gradient decline
• Oh unlanced boil; oh zettabyte of intractability, oh sneering dunderheadery
• Has’t not yet recovered from thy intellectual narcolepsy?
• Get thee to the remainder bin, thou tumescent plaything of conformity
• There is no more substance in thee than in a bucket of Karmelkorn
• Save me from thy towering bushwa; feed me not thy intellectual gruel

Weaponed with a Shakespearean insult, you will, in any verbal cage match, send your opponent to an ignominious smackdown. However, full disclosure requires that I include a word of warning. Recall Montressor’s opening sentence in Poe’s “The Cask of Amantillado:” “The thousand injuries of Fortunato I had borne as I best could; but when he ventured upon insult, I vowed revenge.” And what a revenge! Montressor bricked and mortared up the unfortunate Fortunato, alive, in a small catacomb recess. Perhaps Fortunato failed to make his insult sufficiently Shakespearean. In any event, exercise some caution: make sure that your insultee is not, like Montressor, “a villain with a smiling cheek, a goodly apple rotten at the heart,” that he is not “deep, hollow, treacherous and full of guile,” and that he is not “a huge translation of hypocrisy, vilely compiled.”

Wednesday, December 29, 2010

Hardy Boys Books and the Scene of Reading

I do not remember myself ever not reading. I do remember, though, the first books I read with an intentionality budded by sheer breath-held interest, books that I requested as birthday and Christmas presents, books that I embraced and which embraced me back, books that bridled my imagination and led it to the pasture of small-town Bayport: the Hardy Boys books. It’s true. The gesso that readied my life-long love of reading, that underlay my forty plus years of studying, teaching, and writing about books, was the intrepid sleuthing adventures of teenaged amateur detectives Frank and Joe Hardy.

What, after all, was there not for a young boy to like? Frank and Joe lived lives canopied by fast-forward action, mystery, and a shuddery, seeping atmosphere of noir. Their dad Fenton did not sell insurance or cars or hardware, did not occupy a nondescript cubicle as a nondescript drone in a nondescript office, did not farm or bake or plumb or excavate. No, he was a professional detective. He unsecreted secrets, unbaffled the baffling, clarified the recondite, explained the inexplicable, penetrated the impenetrable—and best of all, he often sought his sons’ assistance. They had girl friends and frolicked at beach parties and barbeques. They had cool friends, my favorites being roly-poly Chet with his yellow jalopy and buff Biff with his fearsome pugilistic skills always at their service. They went to school but never sat in a classroom. School made no claims on their time: they never had to study, do long division, or memorize all the states and their capitals. They never experienced the distress of bringing home a report card. They had a car, motorcycles, and a boat. They spoke Spanish. They regularly bested adult authority figures. Frank and Joe garmented the collective id of the planet’s prepubescent males with velvety wish fulfillment.

Inevitably, the Hardy Boys books have drawn the lofty disdain of critics. The rasp of literary theory and its critical pieties has zested the Hardy Boys rind. For some, the books are aesthetically moribund: lackluster prose coupled with templated plots conjoined with wholly absent character development. For others, the boys epitomize, as their name suggests, the hardness and hardiness of the militantly gendered male personality, and their stories reinforce the relations of a patriarchal social structure, a world of male struggle for success, a world in which mothers and girl friends appear in supporting roles only. For others, the stories perpetuate racial and ethnic stereotypes or inscribe social class hierarchies. For others, bent on queering the books, the girl friends and fraternal relations mask a homosocial, perhaps even a homoerotic, thematic. For still others, noting the strange ineptitude that seemingly subverts Fenton Hardy’s professional and paternal authority, the books enact a totemic dance around the figure of the vanquished father.

While these criticisms may have merit, I think they are ungenerous because they overlook the value of the books as narratives, as ordered encounters with lives not our own, lives that report experiences not our own and from which we can learn. I passed from my world, with its choices and contingencies and vicissitudes, to the Hardy boys’ world and I experienced it. I saw it, heard it, even felt it. The space between those worlds shrunk with intimacy, and if there was a line of demarcation between them, a border of some kind, I passed over it with the passport of a willing imagination. And then I returned, if not a better person, then certainly a smarter one. David Abram, philosopher and environmental ethicist, observes that the tales told in oral cultures carry “nested in their narratives much of the accumulated knowledge of the culture,” that they convey the “practical knowledge” necessary “in one’s daily actions and interactions,” and that once those narratives were written, they became unchanging and autonomous, losing their grounding in the specific contexts of situation and character that called them forth. I would assert, however, that written narratives can perform the same function Abram ascribes to oral narrative.

Reading the Hardy Boys books, I learned that sibling relations did not need to be as fraught as was my brother Dennis’s and mine. I learned that fathers and sons can share interests and confidences, and that fathers were sometimes fallible. I learned that mothers love without qualification and that spinster aunts are all bark and no bite. I learned that, despite the enshrined cultural narrative that celebrates them, small towns can harbor people with dark intentions, can be cosseted enclaves filled with jeopardy and intrigue. I learned that analytical thought required one to track and trace, decipher heralding signs, and draw conclusions. Most important, perhaps, I learned that no difference need obstruct the stimuli of words on a page and the stimuli of imagination. Those words and I became a conjoined focus, a coming together of the external me reading an arrangement of letters and internal world of the narrative. The subtle and large gestures of a character’s eye or face or body; the gradients of event; the tonal resonance of voice and mood; the depth and dimension, the cavities and densities of place—these were as carnal, as enfleshed, as I was, as alive as I was, their inhalations and exhalations as rhythmic as my own. I made my mark on those stories; they made their mark on me.

I still have those Hardy Boys books, boxed and carefully stored in the basement. I recently pulled out and reread one that I remember being a particular favorite, The House on the Cliff. I expected to be recognized, welcomed, like some prodigal son returning from a far-off country. Instead, it shunned me and sent me away. I was not stirred by the forbiddingly secret caves, was not shaken by the always lurking, drug-smuggling villains, was not pinwheeled by the slipstreaming danger that enveloped the boys seemingly in every chapter. My interest in this book, so foundational in my reading life, was a lost drachma that no amount of light, no amount of careful sweeping, could uncover. I should have known better. The boys and their adventure were carapaced in timelessness, while I had become a creature of time. I was not the same reader. I changed, and suddenly the books that had become transparent in my hands, unmediated media, grew opaque, caused a vague dissatisfaction, seemed somehow monochromatic, limited, a threshold I felt an urging to cross. The very books that had brought me to reading had spurred me to reach beyond them to a relationship with more complex texts. Exactly why, I cannot say. It’s a mystery, one worthy, perhaps, of Frank and Joe.

Friday, December 24, 2010

My MRI Experience

Yesterday morning I had an MRI, an experience that, were I a Calvinist, would have convinced me of that faith’s two fundamental propositions: that I had, in some way unknown to me but blindingly apparent to omniscient Providence, sinned grievously; and that no affliction is unaccompanied by the catalyzing grace needed to overcome it.

My appointment was scheduled for 6:45 a.m. Now, an MRI before breakfast, before, even, I’ve managed to shake off the burrs of sleep and insert the day’s coffee IV, strikes me as a squalid defilement of all that is human. Why so early? I live in a rural community and the nearest hospital is located in the county seat some 15 miles up the road. The county hospital does not have an MRI scanner, but a truck bearing one comes every other Tuesday, and on this particular Tuesday it was beginning its rounds at my county’s hospital. I arrived at 6:30, knowing that when I reported to the reception desk I’d be spending approximately 15 minutes answering the same questions I’ve answered on previous visits, filling out the same forms I’ve filled out on previous visits, and signing various documents confirming that I’ve been told this or shown that—all of which I’ve done on previous visits. I then took a seat in the waiting room and picked up a stray copy of Midwest Living, just to scan, for I expected to be MRIed at any moment.

At 7:15, the hospital’s lab technician asked me to follow him to the lab so he could draw some blood to test for something or other. “Wait a minute,” I said, “I’ve been to my doctor’s office twice in the past week and both times she drew blood. And one hour after the last visit, I got a phone call from her nurse telling me they hadn’t drawn enough. So, I had more drawn just yesterday at the local clinic. I’m getting a little tired of being poked, penetrated, and tapped. I feel like a toothpicked cocktail frank in a medical buffet.” Truth be told, I’m no High Nooned Gary Cooper when it comes to needles. Perhaps I suffer from aichmophobia, the fear of sharp, pointed objects. No doubt, I am an exuberant sulker; as Voltaire observed, I take “pleasure in complaining” and “delight in viewing only evil.” But, he checked his records and, sure enough, he had the blood the test required. Next, he began reading a series of questions, all of which, I quickly saw, had to do with surgeries that would have implanted some ferric object inside me—screws, stents, pumps, and the like. After the 5th question, I said, “Look, let’s save ourselves some time. Other than a tonsillectomy when I was 3 years old, I have never had surgery of any kind.” He was, however, a man indentured to the fierce banality of a process for which he was merely a carrier, not the creator. He continued asking, dutifully checking the “no” boxes, and had me sign a form saying I’d been asked the questions. Then back to the waiting room and Midwest Living, which I now began to read.

In the middle of an article about a corporate executive who had fled his Manhattan suite for small town Iowa living and designer bird-house building, I was called for my MRI. It was 8:05. “You know,” I told the two attendants who walked me to the truck, “I was told my appointment was at 6:45, and I’m not a little pissed off that I’ve had to wait an hour and twenty minutes. Now, I know these things happen, and it’s probably not your fault, but, damn, an hour and twenty minutes!” “Oh, I’m sorry,” one of the attendants said; “it seems a miscommunication occurred between your doctor’s office and the MRI scheduler.” A “miscommunication occurred.” Such a convenient use of the passive voice; how cleverly it obscures assigning anyone fault, how sly its practiced use in hemming the ragged edge of a patient’s anger. Well, I was having none of it. I’m not an English teacher for nothing. “That may well be the case,” I said, “but, you know, I’m not in the mood to be Strother Martined.” They looked perplexed. “You know, the actor who played the warden in Cool Hand Luke? His tag line is, `What we got he-ah is a failure to communicate.” They hadn’t seen the movie.

The MRI itself, believe it or not, was a warm Pacific slipstream in the thin, cold current of my wintery discontent. Stretched comfortably on the table, covered in two blankets, head padded in place, the on-call bulb firmly grasped in my right hand, I was gingerly slid into the center of the machine—birth in reverse, a return to the womb. Sure, instead of the soothing beat of the maternal heart, I heard only the cacophonous clang of jackhammer staccato and the stiletto chir of dial-tone buzz, but I tried to imagine it as the atonal music of a John Cage or Arnold Shoenberg. Imagination, however, deals with the essence behind reality, and when that ear-assaulting clangor proved impossible to get behind, I resorted to a strategy I have used intermittently in the past in similar situations: a recurrent fantasy involving Salma Hayek and cellophane—a fantasy so potent that, with five minutes to go in the procedure, it got me through being slid out for yet another poking and penetrating, this one with some strange brew to “provide contrast.” Fantasy does not genuflect to the imperial demands of reality. Fantasy is dissociation from reality. I’ve always been good at dissociating.

And then, finally, I am released from the magnetic womb, rebirthed, released into a world where breakfast and a Mr. Coffee machine await. “Good job, Jerry,” one of the attendants said, “we’ve got clear images.” This, of course, was the verbal equivalent of a lollipop, my “good job” being only my capacious talent for lying still. Little did they know the role Salma played in that stillness. I did worry briefly that the images I had conjured might, somehow, leave a residue, a resonance, in those magnetically-generated images of my brain, and that, if they did, they had the potential for being WikiLeaked. That could prove embarrassing. Is the mind in the brain? Detached immaterially from it? Well, that’s a cirque du soleil of debates, best left to the experts. I shrugged it off as a kind of wrestling beneath my weight class.

It is reported that French novelist Honore de Balzac carried a cane upon which was written, “I smash all obstacles.” Upon hearing that, Franz Kafka declared his cane should read, “All obstacles smash me.” Were it not for Salma, the efflorescent Salma, the luminescent Salma, the Salma who redeemed my MRI experience with the magnetic resonance of fantasy, I would have exited that MRI scanner truck, halt and hobbled, leaning heavily on Kafka’s cane.